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Abstract 
We examined the lay people’s social representation of 23 possible causes of severe traffic accidents. 160 Romanian 
students filled in a questionnaire which assessed the relevance of each cause for a fatal accident. We used factor 
analysis to develop a pattern of consensual causes that are involved. The results suggest four central causes which 
reflect an absolute consensus among participants. People focus on general explanations provided by mass-media and 
less on specific traffic violations. The social representation of the accident is limited in terms of causation scenarios 
and is influenced by the way the mass-media decides to present the news. 
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1. Introduction 
Road accidents are one of the main causes of human suffering, injury, death and economic losses in the 
modern societies. Every 30 seconds someone in the world dies in a traffic accident and every second 
someone is being injured (World Health Organization, 2009). In 2009, Romania registered 130 fatalities 
per million inhabitants, being the first country in the EU. In 2010, only in the first 10 months, there have 
been more than 7000 severe crashes, leading to over 1700 deaths and 6400 injuries (European 
Commission, 2010). In other words, Romania’s average fatality rate is 1/3 meaning that one out of three 
accidents that occur is fatal, while the EU mean ratio is 1/40 (CNADNR, 2010). 
According to the Social Representations Theory (SRT – Moscovici, 2008) human thought is relational 
at root (Joffe, 2003). Explanations and judgments are not constructed within individual minds but in the 
‘unceasing babble’, the ‘permanent dialogue’ that people have with each other (Moscovici, 1984) and 
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with institutions. A social representation (SR) guides behavior because it reconstitutes the elements of the 
environment where the behavior is to take place (Moscovici, 2008). 
Regarded within a structural framework, a SR is a socio-cognitive system that processes an aspect of 
the world (i.e., a social object, such as risk). As a system, the representation is an organized set of 
opinions, attitudes, beliefs and information referring to an object or a situation (Abric, 1989). Any social 
representation is organized around a central core (or nucleus) which structures the content. The central 
core provides the representation with its significant properties (meaning, normative/evaluative and 
prescriptive functions, etc.). The structural approach allows a series of analyses within a representation as 
well as formal comparisons between representations. SRT-driven studies focus on commonalties across 
groups of persons in particular, how they make sense of particular risk issues, and how their meaning 
structures evolve. The meaning making process is linked to the social interaction and communication 
processes, including media communication.  
Media refers to any type of distance communication technologies such as radio, television, print 
journalism, and the internet. The audio-visual and print media are likely to feature as sources of 
information, opinion-making, and general knowledge (MacDonald, 2003). However, news media do not 
merely present a reliable image of reality. Instead, they simplify or sensationalize it, and set up debates 
concerning responsibility and blame, in the hope of attracting mass audiences, often feeding the imagery 
of numerous risks, including traffic accidents. In short, the meanings of a social object such as the traffic 
accident are being transmitted both by the media using linguistic, iconic and metaphorical features, and 
through shared communication between lay people. 
2. Aims and hypotheses 
Previous studies (e.g., Havârneanu, 2010b; Holman, Havârneanu, & ğepordei, 2010) have shown that 
people evoke different types of causes for a traffic accident: general causes mentioned in news reports 
(e.g. inattention, rebellious driving), the violation of specific traffic rules (e.g. over-speeding, drunk 
driving), but also causes which are not related to the driver (bad luck, the poor infrastructure). In addition, 
we have already found that accident consequences are more salient than the causes (Havârneanu, 2010b). 
Therefore, this study is focused on understanding the representation of accident causation. We seek to 
compare the perceived causes of fatal accidents and to check the centrality of these causes in the social 
representation structure. We expect that fatal consequences will be mostly attributed to general or 
ambiguous causes often mentioned by the media (e.g. inattention, careless driving etc.). Secondly, we 
start from the assumption that not all traffic violations are acknowledged as causes for fatal crashes, and 
intend to find out which violations are perceived as such. We differentiate between three categories of 
violations depending on their effect on safety: (a) violations which affect everybody’s safety (e.g., illegal 
overtaking), (b) violations which affect only personal safety (e.g., not wearing the seatbelt), and (c) 
violations which may affect both, depending on the context (e.g. over-speeding). We assume that the first 
category is most salient in the social thinking.  
3. Method 
3.1. Participants 
160 Romanian students (119 females and 41 males) participated in this study. Their age ranged from 
19 to 52 (M=22.27; SD=5.44). 113 (70.6%) had a driving license and 47 (29.4%) din not. The drivers’ 
total mileage ranged from 100 km to 800.000 km (M=32.906 km; SD=95.867). Spearman’s 
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nonparametric correlation showed a correct association between age and total mileage (0.52; p<.01), with 
younger drivers being less experienced than older ones. 
3.2. Procedure 
Participants were given a questionnaire measuring the perceived causes of fatal traffic accidents. The 
instructions were the following: ‘In the table below there are randomly listed 23 causes which are more or 
less relevant for a fatal traffic accident. We would like you to evaluate how likely it is that each cause 
would lead to such an event. For example, how likely is it that speeding would  cause  a  fatal accident?
Make this evaluation using a scale from 1 to 9 (with 1 being ‘very unlikely’ and 9 being ‘very likely’). 
For each cause choose one single answer.’  
The list comprised 23 causes grouped in more categories. Four violations referred to everybody’s 
safety and three violations concerned only personal safety for different type of road users. Five violations 
could affect both one’s and other’s safety depending on the traffic context (drunk driving, violating a 110 
km/h speed limit, violating a 50 km/h speed limit, phone use without a hands-free device, no first aid kit 
and fire extinguisher, and the lack of mandatory documents). All these traffic norms were presented as 
violations. In addition to the ‘normative’ causes, there were also 7 general causes frequently evoked by 
mass-media and authorities (inattention, fatigue, rebellious acts, aggression, the current road 
infrastructure, lack of experience, and imprudent acts). Finally, the list included two external attributions 
regarding incontrollable factors (bad luck, and God’s will). The last item referred to the inefficient police 
actions as a cause for severe accidents (i.e., police fines are too small / police actions are too soft). There 
were no reversed items. Thus, high ratings reflect a higher probability of the cause to be fatal. After filling 
in the questionnaire, participants reported their age, gender, and mileage. 
4. Results 
In order to reveal the consensual picture of the possible fatal causes, we conducted the data analysis on 
the whole group. We examined the direct causal link between each of the proposed causes and the 
outcome in order to differentiate between the relevant and irrelevant perceived causes. In this approach, a 
cause is considered relevant only if it is endorsed by more than 50% of the participants, which fulfils the 
requirement from social representations to be consensual. To do this, we need to choose an item average 
criterion, which sets the level at which a participant can be considered as endorsing the causes. According 
to Rafiq, Jobanuptra, & Muncer (2006), 3 or 4 can be used as criterions on 5-point scales. On this basis, 
on the current 9-point Likert scale we have set the criterion at 6. Thus a participant is considered to 
endorse the cause if their item average is above 6. We sorted all the causes according to their perceived 
importance. The causes can be regarded as relevant up to the point where less than 50% of the 
participants endorse them at the level of 6. The consensus of responses has further been analyzed 
according to several descriptive statistics: the mean, mode, and the minimum values.  
For the first four causes in the ordered list (drunk driving, rebellious acts, inattention, and fatigue) the 
endorsement rate was above 85% and the means ranged between 7.74 and 8.57. The mode value was 9 
showing that most respondents perceived them as deadly; the minimum scale response was 3 indicating 
that nobody perceived them as totally safe. Thus, these four causes were accepted as absolutely 
consensual for the whole social group. The next four causes (illegal overtaking, violating a 110 km/h 
speed limit, imprudent acts, and illegal road crossing) were retained as highly consensual (endorsement 
rate > 70.4%, mean > 6.97, modes 9 or 8). While breaking the 110km/h speed limit is perceived as 
potential deadly behavior (mode 9; M=7.32; SD=1.78; 76.9% endorsement), exceeding the 50km/h speed 
limit does not seem deadly (mode 2; M=3.86; SD=2.66). Only 8.1% of the total group endorses this cause 
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above 6. The paired samples t-test showed a significant difference between the violation of the two 
different speed limits [t(159)= 24.76; p=.000]. 
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the data, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
to examine how the causes group together and what hidden factors can be revealed. We used the Principal 
Component method (PCA) and Varimax rotation. The determinant value is 0.001, and the KMO 
coefficient is 0.76. Barlett’s test of sphericity is significant (p=.000). After 8 iterations, 7 factors have 
been computed. There are 96 (37%) non-redundant residuals with absolute values greater than 0.05. The 7 
factors explain 62.08% of the model’s variance. The first two factors are the most robust including more 
items with saturations over 0.60. The only cause which did not load in any factor is ‘running though the 
yellow lights’. The only cause which loaded in two different factors is the ‘lack of experience’. Factors 1, 
2, and 4 include mostly the causes which are not represented as deadly. In contrast, the factors 3, 5, and 6 
include the consensual causal links of fatal traffic accidents. The last factor includes an apparently weird 
association between over-speeding and the road infrastructure. This 7-factor solution is briefly discussed 
in the next section. 
5. Discussion 
In this study we investigated the lay interpretation of what may act as a cause for deadly traffic 
accidents. The list we have proposed is not exhaustive but it is based on the causes frequently evoked by 
the participants in our previous studies and the causes often cited by the Romanian mass-media 
(Havârneanu, 2011). To our knowledge there are no similar studies in the international literature 
concerning this topic. Despite the main limitations concerning the sample size and gender imbalance, the 
results support the initial claims and help clarifying what the broad consensus is.  
On one hand the causes which are perceived as deadly are general expressions mentioned by the 
media: rebellious acts, inattention, fatigue, imprudent acts. This is consistent with the SRT principles 
(Moscovici, 2008) that mass-communication processes shape the social thinking. On the other hand, the 
perceived deadly causes are – with minor exceptions – the violations which always or occasionally affect 
everybody’s safety: drunk driving, illegal overtaking, and breaking high speed limits. Most of the 
violations regarding one’s own safety are not perceived as causes of death. The only exception is the 
illegal road crossing. It means that road users consider themselves vulnerable only as pedestrians and not 
as drivers or bikers. From this point of view, fatal traffic accidents include only cars hitting pedestrians. 
Furthermore, speeding is a cause of death but only at a high limit. This is consistent with the preliminary 
results from our previous studies (Havârneanu, 2010a). Thus, people do not consider the deviation from 
low speeds such as a 50km/h limit to be dangerous. When combined, these two findings provide a 
clarification about the representation people have about urban accidents. They suggest that pedestrians die 
because of their own deviant and risky behavior (i.e., crossing illegally), and not because of the deviant 
behavior of drivers who exceed the 50 km/h speed limit.  
These interpretations are also supported by the exploratory factor analysis which helped us identify 
hidden associative relations between the perceived causes. The factor solution partially resembled the 
initial classification of violations according to their impact on safety. The causes merged into ‘common 
knowledge’ patterns, easy comprehensible for the lay public. The first factor includes most violations 
which affect personal safety and which are not perceived as deadly: not wearing a helmet, not wearing the 
seat-belt, no first aid kit and fire extinguisher, aggression, the lack of mandatory documents. Therefore it 
can be labeled ‘own safety’. Factor 2 (labeled ‘other’s safety’) includes most violations which affect 
everybody’s safety and which are not perceived as deadly: tailgating, zig-zag lane change, phone use 
without a hands-free device, small police fines. Drunk driving, illegal overtaking and rebellious acts 
loaded in factor 3 probably because the two specific behaviors are good examples of ‘rebellious acts’; in 
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turn, this phrase is an adequate label for the underlying factor. Factor 5 (‘incautious acts’) includes illegal 
road crossing and imprudent behavior, suggesting that the first may be a common illustration of the latter. 
Hazard and God’s will are relatively similar due to their ‘uncontrollability’ (factor 4) and are not 
perceived as a possible cause of death. On the contrary, they appear among the least possible causes of 
death, meaning they confer protection against accidents. This is consistent with a possible existence of a 
‘religious bias’ (divine protection), or a belief in the ‘good luck’ (similar to the optimism bias).  
Inattention and fatigue merged together in factor 6, which can be labeled as the first variable. This 
corresponds to the common shared knowledge that fatigue alters the driver’s attention. This factor is 
important for the way mass-media presents the news. The discourse mass-media uses is often general 
without pointing out the particular cause and ‘inattention’ is one of the most evoked causes. According to 
our data, the lack of attention is likely to be interpreted as fatigue. However, there are situations when 
inattention has nothing to do with fatigue. It may be due to the driver distraction or due to an excessive 
workload. Therefore, these results can help improving the message framing in order to promote correct 
public information and a more accurate representation about the real causes which lie behind a specific 
outcome. Lastly, the factor solution reveals a latent association between speeding violations and the 
current road infrastructure (factor 7). This association is relevant for the Romanian driving context; in the 
absence of the highways, drivers might exceed the speed limits especially when travelling long distances 
and when forced to cross many villages and cities. 
In conclusion, the social representation of a threatening object such as a fatal car accident appears to be 
selective or distorted in terms of causes. The way the language is used, what distinctions are being made 
through it, how these distinctions are contested and defended, which categories are being chosen for 
carrying the core meanings, all of these are crucial hints for an effective accident prevention and driver 
education. These can be the goals of future studies. 
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